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Pragmatic Ethnography: Or How to Peel Back Layers of Meaning by Extending 
Research across Space and Time1 
Éva Rozália Hölzle—Social Anthropology, Bielefeld University 
In 2014 Tim Ingold published in HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory an article titled ‘That’s 
enough with ethnography!’. In the essay, he urges anthropologists to rid themselves of 
‘ethnographizing’ (386) and instead advance participant observation as the principal method 
of anthropological knowledge production. He argues that calling fieldwork ethnographic is 
contradictory because this suggests that face-to-face interactions are conducted with ‘one’s 
back […] already turned to them’ that is to interlocutors (Ibid.). Using the literal Greek 
translation, he specifies ethnography as a description of the people that is done after the 
fieldwork (385). Anthropology, on the other hand, represents for him presence paired with 
attentive observation from inside (388). While I agree with Tim Ingold that ‘being there,’ 
caring and attending are important ingredients of fieldwork, he does however miss one point. 
Writing does not begin after a return home but rather right at the beginning of the research. The 
continuous back and forth between recording the data, interpreting it and then probing the 
analysis amid the data gathering process while permanently writing down the acquired 
knowledge is what makes an anthropological inquiry ethnographic. As George Marcus (2016) 
writes, for Clifford Geertz ethnography was a way to think through the data and arrive at an 
understanding of humans, i.e., anthropology. Thus, anthropology can be done without utilizing 
ethnography and ethnography does not have to be anthropological.  
In my paper, I wish to join the line of researchers, who since Tim Ingold’s article came forward 
in defending ethnography through a series of publications. Thereby, I intend to draw attention 
to a specific kind of ethnography that I call pragmatic. Following the footsteps of scholars—
such as Kristen Hastrup—under pragmatic ethnography I mean theoretical and methodical 
flexibility that is informed by a particular view of the social as emergent and contingent. A 
social world without a prefixed ‘ontological status’ (Hastrup 2005, 143) implies on one hand 
that theories can serve just as temporary answers in explaining the social world. On the other, 
it also suggests that the ethnographic field is not fixed but has to be redefined through 
ethnographic practice over and over again. A pragmatic orientation encourages researchers to 
 
1 A short version of this paper was presented in the conference ‘Entangled Comparisons. Grounding 
Research on Asia—Expanding Research Methodologies’, Bielefeld University, 5-7 September 2019. 
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continuously adjust to the possibilities and constrains of the actual field site (Kovats-Bernat 
2002, 213). Since change occupies a central stage in pragmatic ethnography, it embraces 
surprise as a particular mode of knowledge production while its endeavour is always 
comparative. It motivates thereby not only a multilocal approach but also a temporal extension 
of the research agenda with the aim of tracking events across diverse spans of time.  
How does this look like in practice—is the primary question I wish to tackle in this paper. I 
will proceed by first addressing very briefly the topic of my research that I conducted in 
Bangladesh between 2010 and 2016 and that galvanized a move towards pragmatism. Then, I 
will come to discuss two concrete research strategies that materialized during the fieldwork 
and that grew out from a pragmatic orientation. The first I call mobile fieldwork because the 
research approach was multilocal, nomadic and it extended in time through the strategy of 
regular revisiting. The second approach I term zooming in on a social phenomenon with the 
help of another, in other words connecting two seemingly unrelated social experiences.   
Research Aims in Bangladesh 
Spanning between 2010 and 2016, I carried out a research focusing on four different land 
dispossession cases all of which were state induced and affected indigenous farmers living 
along the north-eastern border of Bangladesh. The actual time spent gathering data in the four 
field sites accumulated to two years. Thereby, I distinguish three phases of fieldwork. The first 
fieldtrip, between July and October 2010, was a pre-fieldwork. The second research phase 
started in November 2011 and continued uninterruptedly until December 2012. The third phase 
of the research was characterised by four follow-up visits (in 2013 and 2014 for three months 
each, and in 2015 and 2016 for three weeks each). I considered these follow-ups as necessary 
to probe the previously gathered data and also to refine and share with interlocutors the already 
written analysis. With the help of the four case studies, my aim was threefold: (1) I set out to 
uncover the drivers of land dispossession, (2) but I was also interested in learning about 
different experiences of violence of the affected farmers and (3) how they dealt with critical 
circumstances in their everyday life. In order to find answers on these questions my approach 
was ethnographic combining extended case method with a mobile and multilocal approach.2 
  
 
2 For detailed description of what ‘extended case method’ is see Evens and Handelman 2006; Gluckman 
1958; Kapferer 2010; Rössler 2003. 
 4 
Mobile Fieldwork 
While extended case study was a conscious choice prior the start of the fieldwork due to its 
relevance of analysing conflict and social crisis, mobile fieldwork paired with a multilocal 
approach was an adaptation tactic to a sensitive and combative field and thus grew out from 
the necessities and constrains of the actual field. For all of the places we worked—under ‘we’ 
I mean my research assistant Matthew and myself—are so-called nationally and internationally 
sensitive zones and our presence created suspicion and irritation among state representatives, 
who repeatedly limited our entry to the field sites. Concretely, this meant that it was simply 
impossible to carry out a classical village study—in which a researcher stays long-term at a 
field site—because state authorities just occasionally and for short periods of time allowed us 
to stay overnight in the villages due to ‘security reasons.’ These restrictions forced us to 
embrace a pragmatic mobility. This concretely meant that I divided our visits to the village 
sites into shorter stays of two to three weeks in order to remain as inconspicuous as possible in 
the eyes of the national and local authorities. However, in order to acquire informed knowledge, 
we kept returning to the same places, rotating in this way among the four different locations.  
In spite of some resemblances this approach that I am calling ‘mobile fieldwork’ is not similar 
to ‘multi-sited methodology,’ which is an exercise in mapping different terrains across space 
and time without, however, adopting the goal of intimate representation (Marcus 1995, 99). It 
also differs from the type of ‘multi-site ethnography’ described by Ulf Hannerz (2003), where 
he clearly states that through this method he was ‘not trying hard to get to know […] individuals 
particularly intimately’ (208). My mobile approach emerged primarily due to state restrictions 
to accessing the four field sites and was therefore neither pre-planned nor opportunistic. With 
constant returning, conversely, the aim was to observe the progress of conflicts while investing 
effort into knowing research participants intimately. This means that the approach rather 
resembles the method that Tania Murray Li (2014, 4) adopted and that she terms ‘revisiting’, 
with the aim of tracking ‘subtle shifts in everyday ways of thinking and acting’ ‘that are hard 
to glean from one-shot research designs, whether based on surveys or ethnographic research.’  
Besides the above delineated constrains, two more factors contributed to adopting a multilocal 
and mobile approach. First, I aimed to understand land dispossession as deeply as possible in 
its complexity and multiplicity. I hoped that a comparative perspective would shed light on the 
different dynamics and facets of everyday life that are present in the midst of conflicts. Second, 
I was interested how conflicts and struggles related to land evolve over time. While staying in 
one place has the methodological advantage of researchers acquiring particularly intimate 
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knowledge of local orders, immobile fieldwork has its down sides, too. It injects a 
methodological blindness towards change and process and deprives the ethnographer of the 
possibility of ‘surprise’ as a particular method of knowledge production (Guyer 2013). The 
switching between sites provided me with the advantage of a far greater mindfulness towards 
variation and the subtle modifications of action (violence as well as agency), of spatial 
transformations and of actors’ fluctuating involvement that constitute important aspects of 
events in progress—all of which might have remained unnoticed if I had stayed in one place. 
Pragmatic mobility, combined with extended case study proved, therefore, to be a useful fusion 
in tracking processes in a comparative manner. Thus, while extended case study requires a long 
stay in the field, its proponents do not insist on a constant presence at one particular site. The 
fieldwork can be fragmented into shorter visits and divided between more than one location. It 
is the job of the ethnographer to establish connections between temporally and spatially parted 
events.  
Moreover, mobile fieldwork provided us with an additional advantage of being able to set aside 
time for writing and evaluating. The recorded data was transcribed as fast as possible during 
our stay at our base between two fieldtrips. We thus returned to each place with already-
obtained information from previous visits. This gave the opportunity to follow along the path 
of the already-acquired knowledge and to gradually deepen the understanding of a particular 
context while cross-checking the previously collected information. The disadvantage of not 
being able to stay a longer period at one place was countervailed with this strategy. Yet, all of 
these tactics did not offer solutions on how to approach violence in its complexity and here I 
transition to the second strategy ‘zooming in on’ a social phenomenon with the help of another.  
Zooming in on 
The interest in violence posed two methodological dilemmas. First, I was confronted with the 
limitations of participant observation, as the violent acts that shattered and simultaneously 
shaped the everyday life of the farmers in focus went beyond visible forms of physical brutality 
and instead lurked in the day-to-day structures of social life. This raised the question of how to 
observe something that is invisible. The only solution to this problem was complementing the 
observed with verbal data. Yet, asking direct questions about violence would have meant 
risking reification and emptying lived experiences. But even if I would have initiated 
straightforward discussions about violence, the overwhelming forms of violent acts were so 
deceitful that they lacked definition even among the affected farmers. This is not a novel 
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problem in the anthropology of violence. As Nancy Scheper-Hughes and Philippe Bourgois 
(2004) assert, violence is a ‘slippery concept’ and it ‘can never be understood solely in terms 
of its physicality—force, assault, or infliction of pain— alone. Violence also includes assaults 
on the personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value’ (1). This simultaneously means that 
violence ‘cannot be readily objectified and quantified so that a “check list” can be drawn up 
with positive criteria for defining any particular act as violent or not. […] Violence defies easy 
categorization. It can be everything and nothing’ (Ibid.,2). If violence is such a fluid 
phenomenon, how can one approach it?  
Many researchers contend that violence necessitates an approximation through the experiences 
and narratives of those who tackle it. Yet when we come to the problem of violence we are 
simultaneously confronted with what Ludwig Wittgenstein (1922) terms the ‘limit of 
language.’ The limit of language designates here not simply an inability to verbalize or an 
incapability of understanding narratives that describe specific experiences of violence, but ‘the 
unknowability of the social world’ (Das 1998, 184). The lived experience is characterised by 
unstructured knowledge and uncertainty. We are rarely fully conscious at every moment of the 
implications that everyday occurrences confront. How do we breach this problem 
methodologically? How do we gather evidence about something that is unclear, lacks 
definition, yet is still present? Confronting this difficulty was the point in my research that 
emotions came into the picture.  
Thus, while I was listening to the accounts of addressing land conflicts, I came to realise that 
there is a metalanguage emerging out from the narratives, where informants were very 
preoccupied with describing how they felt in order to make me understand their situation. It 
took several months until I came to the realization that the emotional narratives I collected were 
more than simple verbalizations of feelings, but instead are about particular experiences of 
violence embedded in the language of emotions. Gradually, I started to see emotions as 
‘concentrated vessels’ of (hi)stories or ‘modalities through which people recall the sensorium 
of violence’ (Feldman). The discovery of the relevance of emotions in relation to violence was 
what within the discipline one might term as an element of surprise or ‘accidental 
anthropology’. Indeed, I did not set upon a journey to study emotions, rather the context 
presented it as something relevant. I would, however, do injustice to the complexity of 
emotions if I would reduce them to the level of merely experiencing violence.  
Aside from a few notable exceptions (see especially Benedict 2005; Briggs 2001; Levy 1983; 
Mead 2001), early anthropologists exhibited reservations regarding feelings. This scepticism 
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can be explained by disciplinary divides underscored additionally with nature versus nurture 
and mind versus body dichotomies. While in the West, from antiquity until the middle of the 
nineteenth century, emotions belonged to the domain of philosophy and theology; psychology 
as an independent science gained an increasing control over the study of feelings after the 
second half of the nineteenth century (Plamper 2015, 47). Meanwhile, scientific diversification 
meant that anthropologists carved out for themselves the study of culture in post/colonial 
settings and sociologists settled for the understanding of how society is structured in the 
industrialized world. In both latter disciplines, emotions were considered as pre-cultural and 
pre-social phenomenon minimally related to either meaning or social organisation. Hence, 
there was no opposition to emotions belonging to psychology. Both anthropologists and 
sociologists accepted thereby the traditional idea promoted during the Enlightenment that 
emotions are opposed to reason. Until the poststructuralist turn, when the anthropology of 
emotions emerged as an independent subfield within the discipline, these dichotomies 
remained largely unchallenged. Yet, such refutations did not expel entirely the older 
convictions that emotions are primarily biological occurrences. Consequently, today roughly 
two different theoretical strands dominate the understanding of emotions: biological and 
cultural constructivism.  
According to the first strand, feelings are hardwired physiological phenomena located in 
individual bodies. This theoretical line, following Paul Ekman’s (1999) conceptualisation, 
acknowledges the cultural variations of emotional expressions, yet nonetheless emphasizes that 
despite disparities there are basic emotions shared universally and independently from cultural, 
social and historical circumstances (see especially Heider 1991). From the 1980s onwards, 
more anthropologists voiced their critiques of such universalistic and biological understanding 
of emotions (see especially Abu-Lughod 1988; Lutz 1988; Lutz and Abu-Lughod 1990; 
Rosaldo 1987;). Especially three views were emphasised: (1) ‘emotional experience is not 
precultural but preeminently cultural’ (Lutz 1988, 5, emphasis in original); (2) not only 
emotional expressions vary but people in divergent cultural contexts feel radically different 
(Plamper 2015, 311-312); (3) the mind-body dichotomy is a Western construct and hence 
people from different cultures not only do not separate emotions from intellect and action, but 
might locate emotions outside the individual body.  
While cultural constructivist theories effectively shattered the ‘idea that feelings are timeless 
and everywhere the same’ (Plamper 2015, 426), it, nevertheless, also has limitations. One 
problem is that by stressing the notion of radical differences, such theories run into the danger 
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of Othering and thus getting dangerously close to exoticizing cultural variation. Second, 
emotional variation implicitly implies that cultures are isolated and timeless. Therefore, 
cultural constructivists not only overlook mutual contact and influence for which historical and 
postcolonial theories offer ample evidence, but they also downplay eventual similarities. Third, 
by insisting on radical contrasts, they make cross-cultural comparison and understanding 
impossible and ultimately dissolve their own object of study, namely emotions, thus the word 
itself is a Western construct. Yet, without a meta-concept, the anthropology of ‘emotions’ 
would turn into a hopeless nominalism (Plamper 2015, 12). Finally, by embracing an overly 
discursive perspective, constructivist theories risk cultural determinism leaving the connection 
between emotion and action unexplored.3  
Partly due to these limitations and partly due to the rise of neuroscience, cultural constructivist 
views have recently lost their prominence in emotional research. Today, biological 
explanations are celebrating a comeback and they have also gained significance in social 
sciences, propelling the emergence of what is called the affective turn (see for instance 
Massumi 2002). The underlying assumption of affect theorists is that affect, feelings and 
emotions belong to different orders. While affect is seen as a pre-linguistic/ pre-conscious 
phenomenon, i.e., a neuronal response in the individual body, emotions on the other hand are 
viewed as cognisant interpretations of feelings and thus culturally coloured. Such attempts are 
characterised by interdisciplinary cross-fertilizations between neurosciences and cultural 
studies. Yet, their risk is that instead of dissolving old dichotomies of mind versus body and 
nature versus nurture, they reproduce it. Thus, if affect is pre-linguistic reaction, this implicitly 
means that the body or the mind belongs in the realm of nature and it is untouched by culture 
or power (Ahmed 2004, 39; Das 2011). Also, the sequential separation of affect, feelings and 
emotions sounds not only mechanical but also remains rather speculative, since there is no 
empirical explanation for how affect becomes a feeling.  
What is striking in these two dominant theories of emotions is that none of their followers 
consider feelings as methodological opportunities to gain insight into another social 
phenomenon (as an exception see Davies and Spencer 2010; Lubrich and Stodulka 2019), but 
rather they treat emotions as independent objects of study. In my research, I deviate from this 
approach since I treat verbalisations with emotional content as lenses or if you wish as entry 
 
3 Alternative concepts such as embodiment (Csordas 1990), lived experience (Jackson 2008) and 
subjectivity (Biehl 2005) suggest alternative paths to overcome these shortcomings, but they can be 
also interpreted as disguise strategies to implicitly deal with but also to avoid directly talking about 
emotions. 
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points into getting closer to everyday life circumstances shattered by the force of violence. 
Furthermore, my proposal is to see articulations with emotional components not as descriptions 
of subjective states, but rather as performative utterances. With this proposition, I wish to take 
a third path—a pragmatic approach to emotions—that builds upon the language theory of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and J. L. Austin. A pragmatic understanding of emotions does not deny 
that the mode through which certain emotions are verbally elaborated is contextually and 
historically dependent. Yet, in contrast to cultural constructivism, it offers solutions for how to 
link action and emotion. 
According to pragmatic language theory, speaking is more than transmitting information—
language is already an action. By talking we simultaneously perform. This should not be simply 
understood as speech involving bodily activities (such as moving the tongue and lips or 
gesturing), but that while uttering, we do things (I promise) or prompt (close the door!) further 
action. In his famous book How to Do Things with Words, J. L. Austin (1962) distinguishes 
between locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary utterances. While locutionary speech is 
defined as a meaningful utterance (the sky is blue), an illocutionary act is ‘doing something in 
saying something’ (I declare you husband and wife) and a perlocutionary act is ‘doing 
something by saying something’ (‘I warn you’) (Cavell 2005, 169). Both latter categories of 
utterances have, according to Austen, a performative force. None of these, however, can be 
found in their pure form in everyday language use. Instead, most of our expressions cover all 
three categories.   
Where do emotions belong? According to Stanley Cavell (2005, 155-191), Austen stopped 
short when it came to the issue of emotions and did not fully utilize the potentiality of his own 
theory. In his essay ‘Performative and Passionate Utterance’, Cavell (Ibid.) sets up to bridge 
this gap and treats emotional expressions as performative utterances with perlocutionary force. 
According to Cavell, the interesting element in passionate utterances is that while they are 
formulated in the first person singular or plural, they nevertheless are not about ‘me’ or ‘us’ 
but directed toward a second person, towards ‘you’. Formulated differently, not the ‘I’ but the 
‘you’ ends up as the center when I utter the sentence ‘I love you’, because the phrase is not 
simply a declaration but simultaneously an expectation or maybe even a demand. This is similar 
to Wittgenstein’s famous assertion that sentences such as ‘I am sad’ or ‘I am in pain’ are not 
descriptive statements of an inner state, but rather an invitation to share (Das 1995, 194). They 
indicate a request for reaction and therefore ‘cannot be treated as purely personal experiences’ 
but rather efforts towards establishing intersubjectivity or prompting acknowledgment (Ibid.). 
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If we take this argumentation seriously, then it is possible to claim that emotions have both a 
performative force, thus their expression might mark the beginning of a ‘language game’ in 
which the narrator and the listener become actively engaged through interactive exchange. 
However, they also reveal something about our relation to the world since emotions always 
involve others or circumstances incited by others. It is, therefore, not misplaced to borrow 
Catherine Lutz’s (1988) assertion that emotions ‘retain a value as a way of talking about the 
intensely meaningful that is culturally defined, socially enacted and personally articulated’ (5). 
I, therefore, never asked if research participants really felt what they said. This was beside the 
point. Rather, I was interested in what is revealed about their relationship with the world when 
they evoke specific idioms of emotion. Or formulated differently, what does, for instance, fear, 
boredom or grief signify? By analysing the nuances of such dominant emotions, I was able to 
capture the micro-manifestations of violence that lurked in the everyday and that included acts 
of intimidation, humiliation, deactivation, deception or subtle but persistent harassment. Yet, 
since I approach emotions from the perspective of pragmatic language theory, I emphasize that 
emotional expressions are not simply descriptive statements, but rather are requests for 
acknowledgment of an active subject position. Such a conceptualization allowed linking 
emotions to actions and helped to see farmers not merely as victims but also as agents. 
Conclusion: Ethnography Matters 
In coming to the concluding part of my paper I wish to turn back to Tim Ingold and his 
disapproval of ethnography. I think such misunderstandings arise from the fact that 
ethnography is viewed merely as a method either for the sake of data collecting or for the sake 
of writing. Yet as Kristen Hastrup asserts  
In anthropology “ethnography” is so much more; it is neither simply a method (a 
synonym for fieldwork) nor a particularly thick description of local realities. Both 
of these are subsumed by a particular sensitivity to the world—a mode of 
perception that includes a reflexive awareness of, and respect for, local 
particularities and complexities on the hand, and the theoretical intervention 
implied by representation on the other. Ethnography and epistemology are 
simultaneously present in the anthropological object. In that sense, ethnography 
always transcends itself (2005, 141).  
A pragmatic orientation during ethnographic fieldwork intensifies this sensitivity, because 
pragmatism encourages adaptation to the field while does not pretend to deliver definitive 
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answers in form of grand theories. As Jean and John Comaroff remark ‘an anthropology-for-
the-present on an ethnographic base that dissolves the a priori distinction between theory and 
method’ (Comaroff and Comaroff 2003, 172 cited in Hastrup 2005, 141). With its theoretical 
and methodical openness pragmatic ethnography moves with the ‘moving frames of social life’ 
(Hastrup 2005, 142) not only across space but also across different spans of time. Establishing 
connections across and within different time frames and not just across spatially dispersed 
events is from my point of view essential in peeling back the layers of meaning that emerge on 
the surface of the social field. Insofar, I regard my six years of fieldwork and its findings as 
preliminary research results and intend to continue revisiting the sites for years to come. Thus, 
in order to engage in meaningful research, it is not enough to dissolve spatial boundaries, but 
we need to resist a neoliberal logic creeping in our way of doing fieldwork that expects quick 
results within a short span of time.  
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